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[Excerpts from article by Xabier Gorostiaga, titled, "Nicaragua: la sorpresa electoral y sus
consecuencias," distributed 03/08/90 by Regional Coordination for Economic and Social Research
of Central America and the Caribbean-CRIES, Managua.] * The results of the Feb. 25 election
in Nicaragua reflect the complexity of a prolonged conflict suffered by the Nicaraguan people.
Electoral polls are incapable of capturing the meaning of an election for a population lacking an
"electoral culture" and experience with opinion surveys, and in the midst of strong polarization
created by war, political tensions, and economic crisis. Nicaraguans' yearning for peace and
economic survival clashed with aspirations for national dignity and sovereignty. A majority were
convinced that Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, friend of President Bush and Cardinal Obando y
Bravo, would have greater potential than Sandinismo for ending the war, and resuming economic
development. Betrayal, deceit, resignation, fear, illusion all had a part in the vote. * On Feb. 25,
Nicaraguans also acted to punish the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) for the military
draft, economic austerity, arrogance and insensitivity. The National Opposition Union (UNO)
received a majority of the vote in some cases even in districts where military personnel were
concentrated. Poor Nicaraguans, including many public employees, voted for UNO. They had
suffered the most from the austerity measures. Some Nicaraguans including FSLN sympathizers ,
weary of deprivation and the daily grind of survival, were disgusted with the omnipresence of
Sandinista militants, and their insensitivity and arrogance seen in excessive campaign propaganda
and festivities. They voted for UNO. * Never has the possibility of peace, or of social chaos, including
civil war and US intervention, been more present in Nicaragua. The electoral process was difficult,
but the transition is even more so. The most pragmatic grouping within the 14-party coalition
headed by Violeta Barrios de Chamorro and Antonio Lacayo confronts a revanchist faction who
wish to see Feb. 25 be transformed into the inverse of July 1979. They seek the total eradication of
Sandinismo, principally through the dismantlement of the army and security forces, privatization of
the state sector, and control of existing popular organizations. They count on US support to attain
their objectives. Barrios de Chamorro has demonstrated pragmatism, tempering her campaign
discourse and the aggressive tone of La Prensa. Will she be able to control the old Somoza era
politicians, the contras, and US pressure in their attempts to coopt her into destroying Sandinismo?
* The vitality of the FSLN after the election, and its importance as the majority party in the National
Assembly confronting a divided, ideologically inconsistent coalition, reflect the tension of transition
process. Concern and uncertainty about the future are shared by winners and losers. Clearly,
political governability of the country will depend on the FSLN, and economic reconstruction on
UNO and Washington. UNO has 52 seats in the National Assembly, less than the 60% necessary
to implement constitutional amendments. Thus, the constitution has become a juridical weapon
wielded by the FSLN invoking the state of law proclaimed by UNO in the elections. The new
government will be able to negotiate institutional modifications, but not substantive changes in
the armed forces, the nationalized banking system, nationalized foreign trade, and social welfare
arrangements incorporated into the constitution. On the other hand, control of the government,
state budget, foreign policy, a large sector of the nation's economy, groups such as the Superior
Council on Private Enterprise (COSEP), and Washington's support give the UNO administration
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power to negotiate that the FSLN has not had to content with in the past decade. [Excerpts from
article by Pedro Rioseco, broadcast 03/03/90 by Cuban news agency Prensa Latina. Rioseco headed
Prensa Latina's office in Managua from 1986 to mid-1989.] * Half a million votes for the FSLN in
the election, 40.8% of the total, should not be dismissed. The FSLN vote demonstrates the strong
political commitments of many Nicaraguans and the effectiveness of FSLN organizing skills, in
spite of economic devastation and the promise of continued contra attacks in isolated regions, and
the promise of continued hostility by the US on several fronts. In the week before the election,
the White House and influential US newspapers, including the Washington Post, acknowledged
the possibility of an FSLN win. Secretary of State James Baker said that if the Sandinistas were reelected in a "clean" election, the US would nonetheless require that the new government's "good
behavior" be demonstrated over an unspecified period of time before relations between the two
countries could be normalized. Meanwhile, the contras in Yamales, Honduras, asserted that if the
FSLN won the election, clean or not, they would not disarm. Next, was the always latent threat
of US invasion, apparently to be carried out with impunity as evidenced in the Dec. 20 exercise
in Panama. This development may have persuaded fearful and undecided Nicaraguans that a
vote for the FSLN would mean more war. * The vote for UNO and other opposition parties does
not necessarily mean support for UNO economic policies. Frustrated Nicaraguans remember the
buoyant economic growth of the first two years after the 1979 revolution. Development loans from
international organizations were closed off to Nicaragua by 1983. In 1985, the Reagan administration
formally imposed an economic blockade that had been in effect for some time. Foreign reserves
plummeted, Nicaraguan public and private companies dependent on US-made parts stumbled
along. The contra war entered its most devastating phases. In the 1980s, the entire Latin American
region was impacted by low export prices, the foreign debt crisis and economic recession. In this
context, even if the Nicaraguan government had continued to the present to implement policies
of direct benefit to workers, including basic foodstuff subsidies, such attempts to tackle a steadily
deteriorating economic situation could not have been more than palliative. Peace and economic
stability in Nicaragua were ultimately dependent on Washington's will, not decisions by the Central
American presidents or Nicaraguan leaders. * Political instability led some Eastern European
nations, including the German Democratic Republic, to unilaterally suspend contracts signed with
the Nicaraguan government for 1990. This brought an additional factor of uncertainty to many
Nicaraguans whose main concerns are peace and economic survival. * As a compensating factor for
the organizational weaknesses of the disparate UNO coalition, the support of the Catholic Church
should not be underestimated. Ninety percent of all Nicaraguans are Catholic. Cardinal Miguel
Obando y Bravo used his right to vote for the first time in his life. Throughout the campaign, Radio
Catolica clearly supported the UNO. * Those who believe that Nicaragua will now join other Central
American countries, where new technocratic rightist leaders have taken over, are forgetting the
roots of the revolutionary process that has shaped Nicaraguan society in the past decade.
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